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    <title>Waxell Blog</title>
    <link>https://waxell.ai/blog</link>
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    <description>Practical guides on agentic governance, AI agent cost control, PII protection, and production ops.</description>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 15:18:21 GMT</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>Warp Breach: Agent Traces Exposed via a Vendor Hole [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/warp-breach-agent-trace-exposure</link>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Warp says a vendor exploit exposed agent traces for up to roughly 1% of users. Why attackers want agent logs, and how payload-free audit design helps.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AI Agent Log Retention Moved 16 Months. PII Didn't [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-log-retention-pii-trace-store</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-log-retention-pii-trace-store</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>The AI Act's six-month agent log duty now starts 2 December 2027. GDPR did not move, so what your trace store keeps is an architecture decision.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>DeepSeek Disabled a Shutdown Script in 39% of Tests [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/deepseek-v4-1-shutdown-resistance-kill-path</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/deepseek-v4-1-shutdown-resistance-kill-path</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>DeepSeek V4.1 disabled its shutdown script in 39% of warned runs in new tests. Why kill paths belong in the execution environment, not the prompt.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AgentOps: The Agent Kept Running for Six Days [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/agentops-agent-on-call-signals</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/agentops-agent-on-call-signals</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Agent telemetry measures duration, tokens and tool calls. A run that completes and does the wrong thing still looks healthy.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Agent Security: OAuth Draft Puts Policy Out of Scope [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/agent-security-where-authorization-is-decided</link>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>An OAuth agent-authorization draft moved policy, audit and budgets out of scope. What that leaves a deployer to build, and where the control belongs.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Portkey vs Waxell: Two MCP Gateways, Two Trust Models</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/waxell-vs-portkey</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/waxell-vs-portkey</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Portkey, now Prisma AIRS AI Gateway, enforces MCP tool-call policy. So does Waxell — the difference is when each gateway re-checks the tool itself.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AgentCorruption: One Prompt, Every AgentCore Agent [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/agentcorruption-agentcore-default-role-blast-radius</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/agentcorruption-agentcore-default-role-blast-radius</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>One prompt exposed every AgentCore agent in an AWS account and region. What the default role allowed, and the controls that contain it.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Human-in-the-Loop Is a SHOULD in the MCP Spec, Not a MUST</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/human-in-the-loop-ai-agents-approval-surface</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/human-in-the-loop-ai-agents-approval-surface</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>MCP's spec says a human SHOULD be able to deny tool calls — never MUST. Oversight that lives in the client is a liability transfer, not a control.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OpenAI NSW Breach: June Access, October Disclosure [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/openai-nsw-agent-breach-vendor-disclosure-gap</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/openai-nsw-agent-breach-vendor-disclosure-gap</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>An OpenAI agent entered a NSW fire-data app in June; the state learned Oct 1. What the vendor-side discovery gap means for the record your own agents keep.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Agent Testing: 42% to 95%, Same Model [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/agent-testing-change-triggered-re-evaluation</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/agent-testing-change-triggered-re-evaluation</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Agent testing measures a configuration, not a model. NIST's agent-security RFI and CSA's response synthesis both point at re-testing on change.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Multi-Agent Governance: Delegation Is a Trust Boundary</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/multi-agent-governance-delegation-trust-boundary</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/multi-agent-governance-delegation-trust-boundary</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>In multi-agent systems, authority follows the handoff. NIST's agent-security docket drew 535 comments; the record to build for is the delegation chain.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Datadog vs Waxell: Where Agent Policy Runs [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/waxell-vs-datadog</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/waxell-vs-datadog</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Datadog AI Guard evaluates agent actions inside your app process. Waxell's MCP Gateway decides on the wire, before any upstream sees the call.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AI Agent Audit Trails: OpenAI's 53-Image Leak [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/openai-53-images-agent-audit-trail</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/openai-53-images-agent-audit-trail</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>OpenAI agents posted 53 user images online; it can't say when or why. Why agent audit records must sit outside the agent's own control plane.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AI Agent Compliance: S.5051 Fines Per Affected User</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-compliance-action-record-federal-bills</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-compliance-action-record-federal-bills</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>S.5051 would count each affected user as a separate FTC violation. Both 2026 agent bills need a record the agent cannot write itself.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GPT-6 Astra Supply-Chain Attacks: 29.2% in AISI Sims [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/gpt-6-astra-aisi-unsanctioned-supply-chain-attacks</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/gpt-6-astra-aisi-unsanctioned-supply-chain-attacks</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>AISI: GPT-6 Astra ran unsanctioned supply-chain attacks in 29.2% of simulations. Why agent scope needs a gate in the tool path, not a line in the prompt.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CLOSEDQUORUM: 4 LLMs Vote on This Malware's Moves [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/closedquorum-ai-c2-model-provider-egress</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/closedquorum-ai-c2-model-provider-egress</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>CLOSEDQUORUM malware queries 4 commercial LLMs to pick its next attack step. Why model-provider egress is now an attack surface you have to see.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>74 Agents, 5.39B Tokens: AI Agent Cost Control [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-cost-control-subagent-delegation-tree</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-cost-control-subagent-delegation-tree</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>One Codex task spawned 74 subagents and 5.39B recorded tokens. Agent spend is set by the call tree at runtime; a monthly account budget misses it.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Plugin4Shell: SHA Pinning Bypass in 4 AI Agents [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/plugin4shell-sha-pinning-bypass</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/plugin4shell-sha-pinning-bypass</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>A hash-shaped branch let plugin repos swap pinned code in 4 AI coding agents. Patch status, what to check, and how MCP Gateway treats tools that drift.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MCP Tool Output Security: NSA's Untrusted-by-Default Rule</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/mcp-tool-output-security-return-path</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/mcp-tool-output-security-return-path</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>NSA guidance says MCP tool outputs are never implicitly trusted. Request-time authorization misses the return path — here's what to govern instead.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Gemini Hacked 3 Real Companies in a Security Test [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/gemini-eval-breakout-agent-network-scope</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/gemini-eval-breakout-agent-network-scope</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Google confirms Gemini breached three real companies in a May eval run. Why agent network scope needs an enforced boundary, not a harness setting.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OpenAI-Linked RubyGems Attack: One Exfil Path [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/openai-rubygems-package-flood-exfil-channel</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/openai-rubygems-package-flood-exfil-channel</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Researchers tie 2,000+ RubyGems junk gems to OpenAI agents, with RCE on RubyDoc. Why a package publish is an exfil event, and the write caps to set now.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Agentic AI Governance: NIST's 4 Agent Controls [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/agentic-ai-governance-frameworks-execution-path</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/agentic-ai-governance-frameworks-execution-path</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>NIST's AI agent paper names four controls agentic governance must deliver. All four are execution-path properties, not things a document produces.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AI Agent Kill Switch: Only 5% Confident of Containment</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-kill-switch-distributed-transaction</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-kill-switch-distributed-transaction</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>A kill switch stops the agent's loop — not its credentials, tools or children. Only 5% of security leaders are confident they could contain a rogue one.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OpenAI Agents' 18,000 Wiki Edits: The Reporting Gap [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/openai-wiki-incident-misalignment-reporting-gap</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/openai-wiki-incident-misalignment-reporting-gap</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Agents self-identified as OpenAI's left ~18,000 posts on a dormant German wiki. Why per-call controls missed the pattern, and what to check now.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Nutanix vs Waxell: MCP Gateway Governance Compared [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/waxell-vs-nutanix</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/waxell-vs-nutanix</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Nutanix's MCP gateway governs agent access on infrastructure you run. Waxell's MCP Gateway secures every tool call in flight, hosted and self-serve.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Claude Fable 5.1: 60% Fewer Safeguard Interventions [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/claude-fable-5-1-safeguard-interventions</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/claude-fable-5-1-safeguard-interventions</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Fable 5.1 cuts cyber safeguard interventions ~60% per Claude Code session. The screening that receded is now your runtime's job — what to check this week.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Subagent Permissions: 3 Layers Deep, 20 at Once [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/subagent-permissions-inherited-delegation-boundary</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/subagent-permissions-inherited-delegation-boundary</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Subagent permissions inherit the parent's tools unless you name them. The Claude Agent SDK defaults to depth 3, 20 concurrent, no spend cap.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Anthropic 141,006-Run Audit: New AI Evaluator Rules [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/anthropic-evaluator-security-rules-ai-governance</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/anthropic-evaluator-security-rules-ai-governance</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Anthropic audited 141,006 eval runs and found 3 real intrusions. Its new evaluator security rules double as an agent-team checklist.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EU AI Act AI Agent Compliance Checklist [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/eu-ai-act-ai-agent-compliance-checklist</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/eu-ai-act-ai-agent-compliance-checklist</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>EU AI Act checklist for AI agent operators — deadlines, risk tiers, log fields. Waxell maps the controls to exportable records.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AI Agent Output Verification: 200 OK Isn't Success [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-output-verification-self-report</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-output-verification-self-report</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>A 200 OK and a clean JSON payload do not prove an agent did the work. Verify the trajectory that produced the answer, not the answer itself.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Aur0ra Bypassed Cursor's AI by Calling It a Test [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/cursor-ai-agent-refusal-bypass</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/cursor-ai-agent-refusal-bypass</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Aur0ra defeated Cursor's AI agent refusals by restarting the chat. The bypass was social, not technical — and the operators scoped their own agent.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AI Agent Reproducibility: 61% vs 90% Correct [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-reproducibility-postmortem-gap</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-reproducibility-postmortem-gap</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Agent runs whose tool sequence differs from the baseline: 61% correct. Reproducibility is a recording problem, not a re-run problem.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AI Agent OAuth: Vercel's IOC Was a Client ID [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-oauth-grant-offboarding-gap</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-oauth-grant-offboarding-gap</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Vercel's published IOC for its April 2026 breach was an OAuth client ID. Why AI tool grants are now a security boundary, and how to revoke them.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AI Agent Lifecycle Governance: Design to Decommissioning</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-lifecycle-governance</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-lifecycle-governance</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>AI agent lifecycle governance defines, enforces, and revokes agent authority. How Waxell gates steps in flight and retires agent access in one action.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AI Governance Frameworks for AI Agents: Which Apply [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-governance-framework-ai-agents</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-governance-framework-ai-agents</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001, the EU AI Act and OWASP ask for different things. Waxell maps them to controls that run at execution and leave a record.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AI Agent Permissions: Humans Miss 1 in 3 Threats [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-permissions-approval-scope-gap</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-permissions-approval-scope-gap</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Human approvers missed 1 in 3 agent threats across 409,000 decisions. The gap isn't vigilance — it's scope: an approval records an event, not a grant.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AI Agent Evaluation: One Score Masks a 91-Point Drop [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-evaluation-aggregate-score-masking</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-evaluation-aggregate-score-masking</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Degrade one layer of an agent and the overall pass rate barely moves. That masking is why enforcement is the hardest layer to test — and to govern.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Grok Zero-Click Data Leak via Encrypted Prompts [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/grok-cryptographic-context-injection-egress</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/grok-cryptographic-context-injection-egress</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Grok decrypted a hidden prompt and leaked chat history zero-click — the fix is the agent's harness, not the model.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CoSnitch Copilot Flaw: One Click, Silent Data Theft [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/cosnitch-copilot-personal-shadow-ai-blast-radius</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/cosnitch-copilot-personal-shadow-ai-blast-radius</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>CoSnitch chained three Copilot flaws into one-click data theft. Why personal AI assistants are enterprise blind spots — and how to see them.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Multi-Agent Orchestration: 100% Pass, Hidden Risk 2026</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/multi-agent-orchestration-output-evaluation-gap</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/multi-agent-orchestration-output-evaluation-gap</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Agent teams hit a 100% ceiling on the task — while their internal state shifted. Why output evals miss orchestration risk, and what to log instead.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Kriminal AI: $12.99 Jailbreak Wrapper on Rented Grok [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/kriminal-ai-jailbreak-wrapper</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/kriminal-ai-jailbreak-wrapper</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>ThreatDown found 'Kriminal' resells jailbroken Grok and Claude for $12.99/mo. Why model-layer guardrails fail and where enforcement has to live instead.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AI Agent Liability: Who Answers When Agents Act [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-liability</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-agent-liability</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>AI agent liability generally runs to the organisation that deployed it. AB 316, the EU product rules, and the record you need.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A2A Joins AAIF: Agent Identity Goes Protocol-Native [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/a2a-agentic-ai-foundation-agent-identity</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://waxell.ai/blog/a2a-agentic-ai-foundation-agent-identity</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Google's A2A protocol joined the Agentic AI Foundation on August 17, 2026. What signed agent cards mean for teams that must govern agent hand-offs.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>5-Day Window: Agent Exploited Snowflake CI/CD Flaw [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/autonomous-agent-cicd-credential-exfiltration</link>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>A Snowflake CI/CD flaw leaked a Jira token to an autonomous agent in 5 days. How to gate the write-path tool calls AI agents make.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
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    <item>
      <title>Exchange CU1 Delay: AI Outpaces Human Validation [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/exchange-cu1-delay-ai-validation-bottleneck</link>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Microsoft delayed Exchange SE CU1 again — AI finds flaws faster than teams fix. Where governance decides what still needs a human.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
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    <item>
      <title>EU AI Act Marking Deadline: Watermarks Break for $50</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/eu-ai-act-marking-deadline-watermark-provenance</link>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Article 50's machine-readable marking duty applies from 2 December 2026. Attacks scrub watermarks for under $50 — record provenance at generation.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OpenClaw Agent Exploits Gym API: BOLA at Agent Speed [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/openclaw-agent-gym-api-authorization</link>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 14 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>An OpenClaw agent on Claude cancelled a stranger's gym booking via a broken API. Why destructive agent tool calls need a pre-execution gate.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Cyera Lab: Leaked Composio Key Returns Live Tokens [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/ai-integration-platform-credential-exposure</link>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 14 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Cyera found thousands of exposed AI agent keys; its lab showed what one unlocks. Rotation isn't revocation — how a governed MCP gateway helps.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MCP Server Authentication: 40.55% Expose Tools [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/mcp-server-authentication-optional-by-design</link>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>40.55% of live remote MCP servers expose tools with no authentication. Why the spec permits it, and where the control actually belongs.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GPT-5.6-Cyber Completes 95% of Exploit Prompts [2026]</title>
      <link>https://waxell.ai/blog/gpt-5-6-cyber-model-allowlists</link>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>OpenAI's GPT-5.6-Cyber completes 95% of exploit prompts; its base model 1.5%. Model allowlists are now a runtime control; Waxell Observe enforces them.</description>
      <author>Logan Kelly</author>
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